Loud Rules by Coale, David & Couture, Wendy
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 2
4-20-2007
Loud Rules
David Coale
Wendy Couture
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Coale and Wendy Couture Loud Rules, 34 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (2007)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2
Loud Rules
David Coale and Wendy Couture*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. LOUD RULES
A. Definition of a "Loud Rule"
B. Incidence of Loud Rules
C. Effect of Loud Rules
III. DICTUM VERSUS HOLDING
A. Background
B. Application to Loud Rules
C. Treatment by Courts
IV. INHERENT POWER
A. Background
B. Application to Loud Rules
V. VOLUME CONTROL
VI. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Are these statements different?
A. We hold that the ERISA plan administrator did not abuse his
discretion in the interpretation of clause seven of the benefit plan.
B. We hold that the ERISA plan administrator did not abuse his
discretion in the interpretation of clause seven of the benefit plan.
ERISA plan beneficiaries are cautioned that further litigation of this
ilk risks severe sanctions.'
The first appears to be a classic case "holding." The second is
something more. In addition to stating a holding, it says that later litigants
* Mr. Coale is a partner, and Ms. Couture an associate, practicing in the area of complex
commercial litigation at Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P. in Dallas, Texas. The
authors would like to thank Loyd Gattis for his research assistance and helpful insights.
1. See generally Tolson v. Avondale Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 1998).
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should give the holding particular deference. The question addressed by this
Article is what to make of this difference.
The second kind of statement can have considerable power. Depending
on its force, such a statement can strongly deter later criticism of the
holding. This deterrent can have particular influence in the modem court
system, where the parties and their counsel settle most cases based on their
perceptions of what a court will do with a case and, if sanctions are imposed,
to them.2 In addition to its in terrorem value, this kind of statement provides
a valuable "sound bite" for later litigants and courts, making itself more
attractive as a citation among the rapidly growing array of precedents now
available to litigants.3
The underlying issue is the legitimacy of this power: should it be seen as
a quirk of some judges' writing style, a dangerous expansion of judicial
power, or a meaningful guide for the development of the law? This Article
analyzes that issue to determine appropriate bounds for what it calls "loud
rules."
Part I1 defines a loud rule as the combination of a statement of
substantive law with an explicit or implicit threat of sanctions if the issue is
relitigated.4 Additionally, Part II examines the incidence of loud rules,
noting several patterns in how courts use them, and then analyzes the effect
of loud rules, including their power to chill innovative advocacy.5
Part III examines the traditional common law concepts of "holding" and
"dictum" and the rationales behind them and then uses this framework to
analyze loud rules.6 Part III concludes that, although the "loud" component
of a rule is technically dictum, it does not raise the same policy concerns that
underlie the dicta-holdings distinction.7
Part IV examines the court's inherent power to regulate the cases before
it. 8 The statement of a loud rule bears a strong resemblance to other
exercises of a court's inherent power, and many of the policies underlying
that exercise are implicated in a court's use of loud rules.
Based on the observations in Parts III and IV, Part V considers if, and if
so how, a court can speak effectively when it speaks loudly. 9 It observes
that the distinction between dictum and holding is often drawn by reference
2. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
3. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 682, 683 (1986) (reviewing
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985)) ("In
interpretive arenas below the Supreme Court, one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of
the holding."); infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 10-35 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 136-61 and accompanying text.
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to whether a statement is "necessary" to the result. Similarly, in the context
of a court's sanctioning power, there is also a focus on whether the use of
that power is truly necessary to advance the orderly resolution of cases. The
focal points of those tests differ, however. For example, in the context of
distinguishing dictum and holding, the focus is primarily on the substantive
law governing the dispute; namely, whether a statement is necessary to the
reasoning that derives the result of the case from prior precedents. In the
inherent power context, the focus is primarily procedural: whether the
statement is necessary to the orderly and efficient resolution of disputes.
This Article proposes that a slight change in the focal points of the two
tests would provide a useful structure to help distinguish appropriate loud
rules from inappropriate ones. Specifically, it suggests that the guide for
distinguishing dictum and holding should recognize a procedural element,
giving full precedential force both to a statement necessary for an opinion's
substantive reasoning, and to one that says how to effectively implement that
reasoning. Similarly, the test for the proper use of the inherent power to
sanction should include a substantive element, in which the use of that
power is seen as most appropriate when it is tied to the core substantive
issues in a case. This Article suggests that this framework can help courts
make effective use of the powerful device of loud rules, while steering clear
of potentially dangerous excesses.
II. LouD RULES
A. Definition of a "Loud Rule"
Statements of substantive law are often accompanied by a warning that
the statement is particularly significant and should not be lightly challenged.
The clearest example comes from a case in which sanctions are not just
threatened, but awarded. The straightforward state court matter of Transport
Indemnity Co. v. Orgain, Bell & Tucker' ° provides a clear illustration. The
holding on the merits was simple. A corporate plaintiff, with a net worth of
more than $25 million, sued under a deceptive trade practices statute."
Since the statute expressly forbade suit by a plaintiff with a net worth of
more than $25 million, the court found that the plaintiff had no claim under
10. 846 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
11. Id. at 879,882.
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the statute. 12 The second holding of the court analyzed whether counsel
should have brought the suit at all under these circumstances, and affirmed
the lower court's award of sanctions for having done so.13
In a case where sanctions are actually imposed, the danger of chilling
vigorous advocacy if the line is drawn incorrectly is well-recognized. 14 The
result is a body of case law that seeks to define the point at which argument
becomes sanctionable. 15 As a result, as in Transport Indemnity, cases in
which sanctions are awarded have two holdings: one establishing that the
result is not what the losing party wanted, and a second that the losing
party's contention was so far afield as to be sanctionable. 16  Both the
substantive holding, as well as the part of the opinion that emphasizes the
strength of the substantive holding, are constrained by a body of precedent.
These guidelines become blurrier when sanctions are not actually
litigated, but threatened if the decided issue is relitigated. A good example
comes from a suit to recover denied benefits under an employer ERISA plan.
In Tolson v. Avondale Industries,"' the Fifth Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment against a plaintiff suing for ERISA benefits, holding that the
administrator had properly interpreted the ERISA plans at issue. 18 The court
went on to state:
[W]e assess costs of this appeal to [plaintiff] and caution him - and
future ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries similarly situated -
that fomenting and prosecuting litigation of this ilk in the face of
plan provisions vesting administrators with discretion to interpret
provisions of ERISA plans and entitlement to benefits under such
plans, could result in sanctions more severe than mere assessment of
costs .... 19
The holding in this case-an administrator given discretion by a plan
can deny benefits-was accompanied by a statement calculated to
discourage testing of the rule by litigants in later cases.20
12. Id.
13. Id. at 883.
14. See, e.g., Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We are well aware that
injudicious awards of [sanctions] may have the potential to chill the zeal for pursuing novel
questions and difficult appeals.").
15. See generally GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 1 1 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES AND
PREVENTIVE MEASURES (Richard G. Johnson ed. 3d ed. 2004).
16. See Transport Indemnity Co., 846 S.W.2d at 883.
17. 141 F.3d 604, 605-06 (5th Cir. 1998).
18. Id. at609,611.
19. Id. at 611.
20. Id. 609-11.
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Another example of a similar admonition appears in United States v.
Burleson.2' In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not
22err in refusing a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines.
After announcing the holding, the court went on to say: "This appeal borders
on being frivolous. We caution counsel. Federal Public Defenders are like
all counsel subject to sanctions. They have no duty to bring frivolous
appeals; the opposite is true., 23  The holding-a court does not abuse its
discretion in refusing to depart under certain circumstances-was
accompanied by a statement to not challenge it.
24
Similarly, courts frequently combine their holdings with more subtle
threats of sanctions by characterizing an argument as "frivolous," which is
the touchstone for the imposition of sanctions. 25 For example, in Highlands
Insurance v. National Union Fire Insurance,6 the court rejected several
subtle challenges to a jury charge that were raised for the first time on appeal
and noted: "There is nothing obvious about these errors so much so that a
contrary contention borders on the frivolous.
27
Finally, courts often make comments that, although not actually
threatening sanctions, imply that any contrary argument has no reasonable
basis and that sanctions would likely result. Some frequently-used phrases
remind how "all" or "every reported case," or the "great majority" or "great
weight" of authority support the result.28  Similarly, characterizing the law
21. 22 F.3d 93 (5th Cir. 1994).
22. Id. at 94.
23. Id. at 95. This statement was supported by citation to an earlier opinion making a nearly
identical observation after affirming an appeal that had challenged a sentence based on a certain
amount of contraband. United States v. Thomas, No. 93-3558, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13748 (5th
Cir. May 18, 1994). A similar sentencing issue appeared in United States v. Fernandez, 127 F.3d
277, 286 (2d Cir. 1997).
24. See also Pucci v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 415 (1984) ("We caution petitioner and other
similarly situated taxpayers that given the ever-increasing caseload of this Court," proper
documentation of transactions is essential); Frankel v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1208 (1984) ("We
admonish petitioner and similarly situated potential tax lawyers to heed the age-old advice offered to
another group of professionals: 'Physician, heal thyself."').
25. See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. P. 1 l(b)-(c) (allowing for sanctions if an attorney's "claims, defenses,
and other legal contentions" are not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law") (emphasis
added).
26. 27 F.3d 1027 (5th Cir. 1994).
27. Id. at 1032. See also United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1990) ("In
an era of burgeoning federal court case loads, it is a senseless drain on judicial resources for us to be
required to devote the time necessary to a complete consideration of issues on appeal which are
entirely lacking in substance.").
28. See, e.g., In re: Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Indeed,
we have been hard pressed to find any case in which a Rule 6(e)(2) proceeding has been conducted
in such a manner; in all reported cases brought to our attention, in camera and/or ex parte
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as "clear" or "settled" can also serve as a warning to litigants that a contrary
argument is untenable.29 While not at the level of a threat, there is a clear
connotation that a litigant urging a contrary position is pursuing the wrong
path.
To summarize, some cases accompany their statements of substantive
law with comments on how much deference the statements should later
receive. 30 They are most apparent in sanctions cases and cases in which a
frustrated court is toying with the sanctioning power, but also appear in
cases where a court makes comments about the strength of a litigant's
arguments. In sanctions cases, those comments proceed in accordance with
established principles and precedent. 3' For other situations, however,
particularly in cases such as Tolson where sanctions are threatened but not
imposed, the guidelines for such statements are less clear. 32
It is on this category of cases-where sanctions are not imposed but are
explicitly or implicitly threatened-that this Article focuses. This Article
refers to the combination of a statement of substantive law with a threat of
sanctions if the issue is relitigated as a "loud rule."
B. Incidence of Loud Rules
Not surprisingly, loud rules most often appear in cases involving subject
matters that are frequently litigated, such as criminal appeals, tax appeals,
and appeals of denials of employment benefits. Additionally, loud rules are
issued most frequently in connection with arguments that, despite being
repeatedly rejected by the courts, are asserted by numerous litigants. Courts
clearly seem to use loud rules as a device to impose order on unruly dockets.
For example, appellate courts in California were apparently inundated
with appeals based on the argument that the "reasonable doubt" instruction
contained in a California statute was defective because it allowed a jury to
convict a defendant on a standard of guilt less than the required standard.33
The court in People v. Hearon characterized this argument as "the soup du
jour of appellate advocacy in criminal cases"' 3 4 and warned: "The time has
come for appellate attorneys to take this frivolous contention off their
proceedings have been the norm."); Don Rose Oil Co. v. Lindsley, 206 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673-74 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("Shell's position is... a concept so outrageous that extensive and computer-assisted
research of all reported cases in all 50 states and in all federal courts has not located a single case
where such an argument has been advanced.").
29. See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Dimitri's 50's Diner L.L.C., 208 F. Supp. 2d 908, 910 (N.D. Ill.
2002) ("[l~t has been clear for more than four years that the place of organization and principal place
of business of a limited liability company are irrelevant ... .
30. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
33. People v. Hearon, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (Ct. App. 1999).
34. Id. at 425.
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menus."35  In People v. Miller,36 another court warned counsel not to
relitigate this issue: "Since this point has been unequivocally resolved in
numerous published authorities, we expect appellate counsel to restrain
themselves from raising this baseless contention in future appeals, thereby
conserving both their time and ours, as well as the taxpayers' money.
' 37
Courts have expressed a similar frustration with a perceived deluge of
weak tax appeals. For example, in Hatfield v. Commissioner,38 the court
recognized the detrimental effect that duplicative and meritless tax appeals
have on the court's function:
In recent times, this Court has been faced with numerous cases,
such as this one, which have been commenced without any legal
justification but solely for the purpose of protesting the Federal tax
laws. This Court has before it large number of cases which deserve
careful consideration as speedily as possible, and cases of this sort
needlessly disrupt our consideration of those genuine
controversies. 9
In fact, the Sixth Circuit has twice issued loud rules related to arguments
made in tax appeals. In Perkins v. Commissioner,40 the court stated:
Litigants are warned that in future cases in which the lower court
has clearly explained, as it has here, the frivolous nature of the
taxpayers' claim that earned income is not taxable, we will not
hesitate to award actual attorney fees to the Commissioner under
Rule 38 as it has been uniformly construed.4'
In another tax appeal, where the litigant argued that an income tax is
properly characterized as an excise tax, the court rejected the argument as
"baseless" and warned: "In future such cases this court will not hesitate to
award damages when the appeal is frivolous, or taken merely for purposes of
delay, involving an issue of issues already 'clearly resolved."'42
Tax appeals have led other courts to make similar statements: "We have
decided not to impose such damages in this case, but if tax protestors
35. Id.
36. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410 (Ct. App. 1999).
37. Id. at 425.
38. 68 T.C. 895 (1977).
39. Id. at 899.
40. 746 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. at 1188-89.
42. Martin v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 38,40 (6th Cir. 1985).
continue to bring such frivolous cases, serious consideration should be given
to imposing such damages; ' 43 also, "The Court of Appeals for this Circuit
has warned litigants that, in future cases which assert the frivolous claim that
wages are not taxable-income, it will not hesitate to award attorneys' fees to
the United States, and this Court now sounds a similar warning.",44 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit warned:
Appellants' contentions are stale ones, long settled against them...
Bending over backwards, in indulgence of appellants' pro se
status, we today forbear the sanctions of Rule 38, Fed. R. App. P.
We publish this opinion as notice to future litigants that the
continued advancing of these long-defunct arguments invite such
sanctions, however.4 5
As a final example, when issuing the loud rule in the ERISA benefits
dispute at issue in Tolson, the Fifth Circuit recognized that cases addressing
the denial of benefits constitute a "burgeoning jurisprudence in this circuit
and elsewhere., 46  The Court warned future litigants to be wary of
"mount[ing] attacks such as Tolson's in the face of such an established body
of law."47  In another ERISA case, a district court similarly cautioned
"plaintiff or others similarly situated that ... they should carefully consider
the evidentiary record before seeking judicial review of a plan
administrator's decision.,
48
C. Effect of Loud Rules
The effect of a loud rule is difficult to underestimate. Speaking directly
to a lawyer's own self-interest in not being sanctioned, as compared to
speaking more obliquely through the language of precedent, may have an
especially chilling effect on innovative advocacy. 49 The effect of a strong,
direct address to the bar is also likely to have a substantial impact on the
development of the law outside of the courtroom. This impact arises
because the great majority of civil cases are resolved through settlement
discussions, which draw upon the bar's understanding of and resolution of
43. Hatfield, 68 T.C. at 900.
44. Hill v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 118, 123 (M.D. Tenn. 1984).
45. Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 661 F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981).
46. Tolson v. Avondale Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 1998).
47. Id.
48. Perri v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 97-1369, 1997 WL 688813 at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
23, 1997).
49. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 265 (4th ed. 1992) ("The
economic theory of law is a theory of law as deterrence, and a threat that is not communicated
cannot deter.").
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the law rather than what courts say to those particular litigants.5 0 A loud
rule thus speaks not only to an audience with a strong interest in the
message, but with an audience that has great influence if and when it heeds
the message.
In addition to the power of such a statement as a threat, it also has power
by simply being pithy. Few would dispute that there are a great, and
increasing, number of cases in today's legal system,5 1 which in turn
produces a great deal of law.52 The effect of this increase in the sheer
amount of available law is magnified because modem research technology
makes this law increasingly available. 3 In the face of this abundance of
precedent, the strong "sound bite" offered by a loud rule can be attractive to
a litigant as a way to distinguish its precedent from the great mass,5 4 or for
that matter to a lower court as a guide for how a superior court would
resolve an analogous issue in the future.55
50. Over 90% of filed civil cases settle without trial. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox,
Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1 n. 1 (1999)
(summarizing empirical studies).
51. See, e.g., Office of Judges Programs, Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (2005) (calculating a 29.3% increase in the
number of cases filed in the Courts of Appeals since 1996; a 5.2% increase in the number of civil
cases filed in the district courts since 1996; and a 48.5% increase in the number of criminal cases
filed in the district courts since 1996); Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals, Final Report 13-16 (1998) (examining caseload statistics and concluding that "[b]y any
measure, the courts of appeals of today are handling more cases, and more work, than their
predecessor courts"); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31-51 (1994) (summarizing studies showing an increasing caseload in the
federal appeals courts).
52. See Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the
Information Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405,407 (1994) ("In 1962, thirty-nine shelf miles of books was a
noticeable but bearable weight on the shoulders of the profession. Three decades later, the weight of
the law is oppressive."). Opinions themselves are longer. See id. at 408; Abner J. Mikva, For Whom
Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357-58 (1988) ("The fact that opinions have also become longer
- sometimes, encyclopedic - is not a court secret either."). Moreover, there is a considerable amount
of "unwritten" law. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509,
546-52 (1992). There is also substantial law generated by administrative tribunals. See generally I
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 1.3 (2d ed. 1997).
53. See Selya, supra note 52, at 408 ("As cases remotely on point become ever easier to find, the
expectations for research rise, courts crank out more opinions, lawyers write more briefs (citing
more opinions), and opinions cite more opinions."). See generally SUSAN W. BRENNER, PRECEDENT
INFLATION (1992).
54. See Selya, supra note 52, at 407-08; see also Schauer, supra note 3, at 683 ("For in the lower
courts, application of a pithy statement, a summary of a holding, or a three-part test is likely to look
very much like application of a statute.").
55. In the same way that loud rules risk chilling innovative advocacy, they conceivably could
encourage lower courts to apply the rules loudly proclaimed even in distinguishable circumstances.
Although there is academic debate over the force possessed by the "predictive" model of how lower
court judges view case law from higher courts, it is unlikely that a lower court would reverse. See
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And, the force that causes courts to use loud rules in the first place-a
perceived problem with a large docket of cases-is only likely to continue to
grow. Judicial caseloads continue to expand, even while courts face budget
challenges. 16
Despite loud rules' undeniable potential for a chilling effect on the bar,
their apparent attractiveness as a citation, and the rising need for docket
control devices, no clear rules guide courts on when a loud rule is an
appropriate exercise of judicial authority. If courts become more inclined to
issue loud rules in other oft-litigated areas of law, they risk expanding the
reach of these potent weapons in the judicial arsenal without the benefit of
clear standards for their usage or precedential value.
This lack of clarity has particular impact on attorneys who must balance
their obligation to zealously represent clients with their duties as officers of
the court. 57 An attorney could conceivably dismiss a loud rule as dicta and
advance a contrary argument on behalf of a client, only to be sanctioned by a
court relying on the earlier loud rule. By the same token, an attorney could
be dissuaded by a loud rule from asserting a good faith argument on behalf
of a client, only to discover later that subsequent courts are not relying on
the loud rule.
III. DICTUM VERSUS HOLDING
An examination of the distinction between dicta and holdings is useful
in establishing guidelines for the appropriate issuance of loud rules by
courts, and for the proper deference to be afforded loud rules by subsequent
courts and litigants. These traditional common law principles help illuminate
the contours of the modem development of the loud rule.
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1994). Moreover, the impact of loud rules is magnified by
the sheer number of lower courts involved. Sanford V. Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants:
"Inferior" Judges and the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1993)
("The behavior of the roughly 100 circuit judges and 500 district judges is, for most citizens most of
the time, far more likely to count as 'the law' than the pronouncements of the nine denizens of the
Supreme Court .... ).
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (compiling statistical studies showing increasing
caseloads); see generally James P. George, Jurisdictional Implications in the Reduced Funding of
Lower Federal Courts, 1 REV. LITIG. 1 (2006).
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2002) ("A lawyer must also act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7 ("A lawyer should represent a client
zealously within the bounds of the law."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1 ("The
duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary Rules and enforceable professional
regulations.").
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A. Background
Perhaps the most basic lesson of the first year of law school is that the
"holding" of a case has precedential force.5 8 "Dicta," on the other hand, a
mildly embarrassing set of "expressions ... beyond the point involved,"'5 9
generally do not. 60 A middle category of statements called "judicial dicta" is
also recognized, which "may be followed if sufficiently persuasive.',
61
Two reasons are generally recognized for distinguishing holding and
dictum.62 One is a concern for full consideration.63 In the words of Chief
Justice Marshall: "The question actually before the Court is investigated
with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may
serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but
their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
58. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989); see
generally JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 198 (1921) ("Judicial
Precedents . . .are former decisions which courts respect and follow because made by judicial
tribunals.").
59. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935). See also Cerro Metal
Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 978 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that another court's statement "was not
the sort of passing reference or overly generalized statement that causes courts to assign little, if any,
weight to dictum").
60. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994) ("It is to the
holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend ...."); Humphrey's Executor, 295
U.S. at 627-28.
61. Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 627-28. See Comment, Dictum Revisited, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 509, 513 (1952) ("Judicial dicta are conclusions that have been briefed, argued, and given full
consideration even though admittedly unnecessary to decision. A judicial dictum may have great
weight.") [hereinafter "Dictum Revisited"]; see also Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 58 (1933)
(describing another court's statement as "something less than a decision," but nevertheless having
"capacity... to tilt the balanced mind toward submission and agreement" because "it is a considered
dictum, and not comment merely obiter"); BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL
USAGE, 275 (2d ed. 1995) ("Thus judicial dictum differs from obiter dictum because it results from
considered controversy, whereas obiter dictum is more in the nature of a peripheral, off-the-cuff
judicial remark."); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J.
1219, 1294 n.153 (1994) (contrasting the reliability of judicial dicta with that of statements made on
the floor of a legislature).
62. But see generally Dictum Revisited, supra note 61, at 516-18 (describing the term "dicta" as
a label for the application of certain "policies in the law of precedent"); Kent Greenawalt,
Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 442 (1989) ("[Mlany different issues
are packed into the distinction between holding and dictum ... ").
63. See Samoffv. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986) (defining dicta
as "a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the
analytical foundations of the holding-that, being peripheral, may not have received the full and
careful consideration of the court that uttered it"); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994) ("Dicta are less carefully considered than holdings, and, therefore, less
likely to be accurate statements of law.").
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investigated."' 64 The second is a broad concern about the limits on judicial
power. Dictum arguably usurps the power of other governmental branches
by going beyond the resolution of cases, the task traditionally seen as the
appropriate one for the judiciary. 65
Courts typically implement these rationales by asking whether a
statement is "necessary" to the result. While the set of "unnecessary"
expressions can be defined quite broadly,66 it is usually held to consist of
statements "not necessarily involved in the case nor necessary to a decision
thereof., 67  The concept of a "necessary" statement serves as a proxy for
good reasoning and judicial propriety, since a necessary statement will
presumably be thoughtful and appropriate.
Lines defined by the concepts of "full consideration," "judicial power,"
and "necessity" are flexible and porous. 68  This leads some to question
64. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 399-400 (1821).
65. See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent
in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. Rev. 541, 559 (1989) ("In a democratic society, treating
statements ... as non-binding dicta helps confine the lawmaking powers of judges to the minimum
necessary to serve the values underlying the doctrine of precedent."); Reed Dickerson, Statutes and
Constitutions in an Age of Common Law, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 773, 788-89 (1987) (criticizing judicial
forays into "polycentric" decisions, the traditional province of the legislature); Dorf, supra note 63,
at 2069 (urging that "sensitivity to the concerns underlying Article 111" should affect the definitions
of dicta and holding); see also Gene R. Shreve, Rhetoric, Pragmatism and the Interdisciplinary Turn
in Legal Criticism--A Study of Altruistic Judicial Argument, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 41, 49 n.31 (1998)
(contending that the legitimacy of dicta is "in limbo"). Cf Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 605, 648 (1992) ("It is clear that dicta -
whether or not courts deem it to constitute an 'advisory opinion' - run afoul of no constitutional or
jurisdictional barrier.").
66. Arguably, everything past the result (i.e., "Plaintiff won") is extraneous material. See Dictum
Revisited, supra note 61, at 509 ("The only statement in an appellate opinion strictly necessary to the
decision of the case is the order of the court."). Such a view is not widely accepted, largely because
of concern that decisions without reasons seem less legitimate than those that explain their results.
See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634-38 (1995).
67. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 142, at 167 (1990). See also GRAY, supra note 58, at 261 ("Judicial
Precedent ... must be an opinion the formation of which is necessary for the decision of a particular
case; in other words it must not be obiter dictum."); GARNER, supra, note 61, at 274, 405 (defining
dictum as "a nonbinding, incidental opinion on a point of law given by a judge in the course of a
written opinion delivered in support of a judgment" and holding as "a determination of a matter of
law that is pivotal to a judicial decision"). The Supreme Court often states this view. See Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not
only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are
bound."). See also Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 490 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Although technically dicta,... an important part of the Court's rationale for the result
[that] it reache[s] . . . is entitled to greater weight .... ). Footnotes draw particular animus. See
Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 647, 647 (1985); Exparte Alexander,
861 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ("This Court is not bound by dicta in footnotes.").
68. As Karl Llewellyn elegantly summarized, a skillful judge always has two tools to apply
precedent. See K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69
(1960). The first is to adhere strictly to the distinction between holding and dicta, confining a prior
case so tightly to its facts that it "holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars." Id.
at 67. The second is to sweep broadly to any attractive language in the opinion, "[n]o matter how
broad the statement, no matter how unnecessary on the facts or the procedural issues, if that was the
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whether dicta and holding can meaningfully be distinguished, 69 and various
scholars have noted the significant role value judgments can play in their
application,70  as well as advocated alternative approaches to the
interpretation of precedent.7 '
The line between dicta and holding is further clouded by the presence of
a middle ground, labeled "judicial dicta." Judicial dictum is generally
defined as "[a]n opinion by a court on a question that is directly involved,
briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by the court, but that is
not essential to the decision."7 2 Statements of judicial dicta are technically
"dicta" because they are not necessary to the holding of a case. They do not,
however, implicate to the same degree as ordinary dicta the concern of "full
consideration," which is one of the rationales for treating dicta and holdings
differently." 3 Unlike ordinary dicta, judicial dicta is, by definition, well-
reasoned and stated only after the court has investigated an issue with care.
rule the court laid down, then that the court has held." Id. at 68. See generally Phillip M. Kannan,
Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 769, 784 (1998) ("In reality, the weight
given to dicta ranges on an inexact, non-linear scale from rejection, to indifference, to persuasion, to
deference, to compulsion. Where particular dicta fall on this scale for a court that is faced with it
depends on many factors .... ").
69. See Doff, supra note 63, at 2003 ("[N]o universal agreement exists as to how to measure the
scope of judicial holdings. Consequently, neither is there agreement as to how to distinguish
between holdings and dicta."); Dictum Revisited, supra note 61, at 512 ("Dictum describes many
different types of statements of law. It describes so much that it can truthfully be said to describe
nothing."); see also Mark M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts
After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371, 419 n.55 (1991) ("[O]ne person's advisory opinion is
another person's dicta."). A classic debate about whether dicta can be identified by reference to the
"material facts" of an opinion is summarized in Alexander, supra note 58, at 18-19 n.21.
70. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988) ("[B]ecause
every material fact in a case can be stated at different levels of generality, each level of generality
will tend to yield a different rule, and no mechanical rules can be devised to determine the level of
generality intended by the precedent court."); see also Dictum Revisited, supra note 61, at 509
(suggesting that the word "dictum" may mean nothing more than "I do not have to follow this
case"). See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
112-17 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1067-68 (1990).
71. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 240-50 (1986); Brian Simpson, The Ratio
Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, I OXFORD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE
148, 164-75 (1961). These perspectives have been subjected to philosophical and practical criticism.
See Alexander, supra note 58, at 34-48; Dorf, supra note 63, at 2029; Ken Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 299-301 (1989).
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 465 (7th ed. 1999); see Hawes v. Luhr Bros., Inc., 816 N.E.2d
345, 349 (I1. 2004) ("Since the issue was briefed and argued by the parties, the court's
pronouncement is judicial dicta, rather than mere obiter dicta."); State v. Rainier, 103 N.W.2d 389,
396 (Minn. 1960) (characterizing a prior court's "expression of opinion on a question directly
involved and argued by counsel though not entirely necessary to the decision" as obiter dictum).
73. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, courts afford judicial dicta greater deference than ordinary
dicta, treating judicial dicta almost like holdings.74
Despite the presence of a middle ground between dicta and holdings and
despite critiques that the distinction between dicta and holdings is
meaningless, there is little question that there are many easily-identified
holdings 75 that courts make serious efforts to identify and define. 76 Because
of this practical reality, and because, at the very least, the labels of dictum
and holding serve as a convenient shorthand for useful "policies in the law
of precedent,"7 7 these concepts provide a useful framework for analyzing the
appropriate precedential role of a loud rule.
B. Application to Loud Rules
The "loud" part of a rule is not strictly necessary to the opinion. By
definition, sanctions are not actually imposed when a court proclaims a loud
rule, and thus the threat of sanctions is superfluous to the holding.78 The
admonishment to future litigants that they risk sanctions by testing the
announced rule is not necessary to the stated result. Indeed, the examples
cited earlier all show that the identical rule of law could be stated with no
accompanying adjunct, loud or soft.7 9 This sort of statement thus has a weak
link to the threshold question of necessity and falls within the technical
definition of "dicta. ' 0
74. Hawes, 816 N.E.2d at 349 ("Judicial dicta have the force of a determination by a reviewing
court and should receive dispositive weight in an inferior court."); Rainier, 103 N.W.2d at 396
(stating that judicial dictum is "entitled to much greater weight than mere obiter dictum and should
not be lightly disregarded"); Chase v. America Cartage Co., 186 N.W. 598, 599 (Wis. 1922)
("[W]hen a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to,
though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum, but is a judicial act
of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision.").
75. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 71, at 296-97 ("[lI]n writing the first paragraph of this Article, I
did not commit assault and battery on George Bush. Nor did I slander Gore Vidal."); Frederick
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 414 (1985) ("1 have equivalent confidence that I will
not receive a notice in the mail informing me that I must house members of the armed forces in my
spare bedroom .. "); see Alexander, supra note 58, at 53-54.
76. See Greenawalt, supra note 62, at 433 ("[M]ost judges take with some seriousness the idea
that they should follow precedents, and the effort to determine the scope of precedents is important
for them."); Alexander, supra note 58, at 53 n.69 ("Lower courts surely follow some version of the
rule model."). See generally United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S.
439, 413 n. 11 (1993) (noting that various past statements on an issue "contain a valuable reminder
about the need to distinguish an opinion's holding from its dicta").
77. Dictum Revisited, supra note 61, at 516-18.
78. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 13-22, 25-39 and accompanying text.
80. A more nuanced holding-dictum distinction is proposed in Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell
Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953, 1065 (2005) ("A holding consists of those
propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that (1) are actually decided, (2)
are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment. If not a holding, a proposition
stated in a case counts as dicta."). Under this test, loud rules are characterized as dicta because the
court steps off the decisional path when stating a loud rule.
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Whether the underlying policy concerns with dicta are implicated,
however, depends on the proposition for which the loud rule is later cited
and on the characterization of the underlying statement of law as dicta or a
holding. A loud rule contains two statements for which it can be cited: "the
substantive law is 'X"; and "any argument to the contrary of 'X' is
sanctionable." 81 Moreover, the statement that "the substantive law is 'X' is
itself either dictum or a holding of the case in which the loud rule is
pronounced. In sum, there are four possible scenarios:
(1) "X" is a statement of dicta, and a subsequent court cites the loud
rule as authority for "X";
(2) "X" is a holding, and a later court cites the loud rule as authority
for "X";
(3)"X" is a statement of dicta, and a later court cites the loud rule as
authority for the proposition that an argument contrary to "X" is
sanctionable; and
(4) "X" is a holding, and a later court cites the loud rule for the
proposition that an argument contrary to "X" is sanctionable.
Each of these scenarios has different policy implications.
If a loud rule is cited for a proposition of substantive law (i.e., cited for
"X"), the analysis of whether policies underlying the dictum-holding
distinction are implicated turns on whether the statement of substantive law
is itself a holding of the first case. If the statement of substantive law is
mere dicta, then the addition of a loud component simply transforms the
statement into strident dicta, and the concerns of full consideration and
judicial limits are, if anything, accentuated.82
If, however, the threat of sanctions is attached to the holding of a case
and the loud rule is cited for that holding, the concerns underlying the
distinction between dicta and holdings are less apparent. In this scenario,
the proposition of substantive law for which the loud rule is cited was fully
considered by the court and thus, like judicial dicta, does not implicate the
81. For example, the loud rule in Tolson contained the following two statements: (1) the plan
administrator did not abuse its discretion; and (2) any argument to the contrary is sanctionable.
Tolson v. Avondale Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 1998).
82. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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concern about the court's degree of consideration.83 Moreover, since the
court's holding was within the court's judicial power when issued, the
concern with the limits of judicial power is weakened. 84 The loud rule more
closely resembles aggressive stare decisis than traditional dicta.
If a loud rule is cited for the proposition that any argument contrary to
the holding of a case is sanctionable, the analysis again turns on whether the
statement of law is holding or dictum. If the underlying statement of law is
itself dicta, the concerns of full consideration and judicial limits are doubly
implicated if the loud portion of the rule is cited since neither the statement
of law nor the threat of sanctions is fully considered or necessary.85
If the underlying statement is a holding of the first case and the loud rule
is cited for the proposition that a contrary argument is sanctionable, the
policies underlying the differentiation of dicta and holding appear, at first
glance, to be implicated. Since the first court did not actually consider in the
case before it whether to impose sanctions, the court's pronouncement that
an argument is sanctionable arguably qualifies as judicial overreaching.
Further, the "loud" part of the rule tends to be a short, succinct
admonishment, suggesting that the court stating the rule did not engage in a
thoughtful analysis of whether asserting a contrary argument rises to the
level of sanctionable conduct.
If the issuance of a loud rule is examined in the context of a court's
entire docket, however, rather than merely in the context of the case
immediately before the court, this analysis changes dramatically. As
discussed above, courts are issuing loud rules in often litigated areas of law
about arguments that are continually re-urged, despite overwhelming
contrary authority.86 In this broader context, a court's determination that an
argument is sanctionable-even if expressed in a succinct statement-is
more deliberate.87 Moreover, in this context, the court's issuance of a loud
rule more closely resembles docket control rather than judicial
overreaching.88
C. Treatment by Courts
Ample evidence suggests that courts in fact find their earlier, "louder"
proclamations to be persuasive for the underlying statement of law, rather
than dicta. In Towers v. City of Chicago,89 for example, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of a due process claim arising from a forfeiture,
83. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 41-46, 55 and accompanying text.
89. 173 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 1999).
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observing that the Supreme Court had earlier recognized "a long and
unbroken line of cases" rejecting similar claims. 90 In the same vein are
Smith v. Cromer,9' in which the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument about a
federal employee's obligation to testify because of that court's previous
recognition of "an unbroken line of authority" to the contrary; 92 and United
States v. Lewis County,93 finding that no exhaustion of remedies was
required when earlier precedent had held to the contrary "in accord with an
unbroken line of authority and convincing evidence of legislative
purpose. 94
The Eleventh Circuit was particularly certain in its reasoning in Rosen v.
Cascade International,95 where the threshold choice of law issue was found
to be settled by an earlier opinion's recognition of "long-settled federal
law."96 Reaching the merits, the Eleventh Circuit again relied on an earlier
court's pronouncement about the clarity of the law: "[I]t is entirely settled by
a long and unbroken line of Florida cases that ... there is simply no judicial
authority [for the requested relief] .... ,9
Courts are also finding their earlier, "louder" proclamations to be
persuasive for the propriety of imposing sanctions for an argument contrary
to that expressed in the earlier loud rule. For example, in Cohn v.
Commissioner,98 the Seventh Circuit sanctioned an overly creative plaintiff
who failed to recognize earlier precedent about the "long and unbroken line
of cases upholding the constitutionality of the sixteenth amendment." 99 In
Sawukaytis v. Commissioner,'00 the Sixth Circuit imposed sanctions, relying
on its earlier loud rules that warned future litigants that the court would not
hesitate to impose sanctions for future appeals based on a taxpayer's claim
90. Id. at 626 (quoting Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 446-50 (1996)).
91. 159 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1998).
92. Id. at 879 (quoting Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67, 70 (4th Cir. 1989)).
93. Nos. 95-35332 / 95-35415, 1996 WL 468651 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996).
94. Id. at * 1 (quoting Dep't of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1966)).
95. 21 F.3d 1520 (11 th Cir. 1994).
96. Id. at 1530-31 (quoting Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 436
n.10 (1974)).
97. Id. at 1531 (quoting Konover Realty Assocs., Ltd. v. Mladen, 511 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla Dist..
Ct. App. 1987)). Examples come from other levels of the judicial system as well. See, e.g.,
Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. Ross-Rodney Hous. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 509, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Every reported case to address the issue has held that interest is available on an award of
attorney's fees under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988" (quoting Preston v. Thompson, 565 F. Supp. 294, 297
(N.D. Ill. 1983)).).
98. No. 96-2035, 1996 WL 681340 (7th Cir. Oct. 31, 1996).
99. Id. at * 1 (quoting Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1988)).
100. No. 02-2431, 2004 WL 1376612 (6th Cir. June 16, 2004).
that earned income is not taxable. '0 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit imposed
sanctions in a tax appeal, noting that its earlier loud rule had been
disregarded: "Our warning has been ignored. We now invoke the sanctions
of Fed. R. App. P. 38 and assess appellants with double costs."102
Courts also cite their earlier, more pointed observations about the state
of the law. In recent years, the Fourth Circuit has twice rejected an
argument about the operation of a particular sentencing guideline by citing
to an earlier case rejecting the argument as one that "borders on the
frivolous." 10 3 A similar fate awaited the claim in Mykaaland v. Burch, '04
where the Fourth Circuit held that it was unconstitutional for a bar
association to make background checks, which the Supreme Court itself had
held to "border on the frivolous."' 5 The court also rejected the argument in
Jane L. v. Bangerter,10 6 to the District of Utah, that laws against abortion
violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude,
which that same court had rejected a year before with the same language.'07
In sum, courts do not seem to treat their earlier loud rules as dicta.
Rather, courts cite them as authority both for the underlying statement of law
and for the proposition that an argument to the contrary is sanctionable.
While this use of the technique may technically qualify as relying on dictum,
it does not present the same policy concerns as other forms of dictum.
IV. INHERENT POWER
A. Background
The authority to make statements to control a docket has a foundation in
a vague but fundamentally coherent set of principles often referred to as a
court's "inherent power." 108 In the Third Circuit en banc opinion of Eash v.
101. Id. at *3-*6 (relying on loud rules pronounced in Martin v. Comm'r, 756 F.2d 38 (6th Cir.
1985) and Perkins v. Comm'r, 746 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1993)). See also Sisemore v. United States,
797 F.2d 268, 271 (6th Cir. 1986) (awarding sanctions because the court's earlier warnings in Martin
and Perkins were disregarded); White v. United States, No. 3:02-0417, 2003 WL 21771053, at *6
(M.D. Tenn. June 12, 2003) (relying on the Sixth Circuit's loud rule in Perkins as authority to award
sanctions for a taxpayer's contrary argument).
102. Parker v. Comm'r, 724 F.2d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 1984).
103. United States v. Hunt, 117 F.3d 1414 (4th Cir. 1997) (table), 1997 WL 381859, at *2; United
States v. Tanner, 917 F.2d 1302 (4th Cir. 1997) (table), 1990 WL 173801, at *2 (both quoting
United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1990)). See also United States v. Burleson,
22 F.3d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1994) (reiterating the caution against frivolous appeals that it had earlier
stated in Thomas, No. 93-3558, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 13748).
104. 953 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1992) (table), 1992 WL 17934.
105. Id. at *2 (quoting Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154, 160 (1971)).
106. 828 F. Supp. 1544 (D. Utah 1993).
107. Id. at 1554 (quoting Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1549 (D. Utah 1992)).
108. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the concept
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Riggins Trucking, the most thorough recent judicial discussion of inherent
power, the Third Circuit observed that three "tiers" of inherent power have
been identified: (1) irreducible powers derived from Article III, which exist
despite contrary legislative direction;109 (2) essential powers that "arise from
the nature of the court," which can be legislatively regulated but not
abrogated; °"0 and (3) powers that are necessary only in the sense of being
useful, which exist absent legislation to the contrary."1 ' Under all three tiers,
a court's inherent powers are generally defined as to those "necessary to
permit the court to function."l"
2
The concept of inherent power has been cited in support of a wide range
of activities, including the power to sanction litigants for bad-faith
conduct, 13 to grant relief beyond a prayer for relief"l4 (but not to enforce a
of inherent power "has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy'); see also David
Moore, Invoking the Inherent Powers Doctrine to Compel Representation of Indigent Civil Litigants
in Federal Court, 10 REv. LITIG. 769, 780 (1991) (stating that the "doctrine of inherent powers is
vague in terms of its scope"); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress Over
Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts -A Study in Separation of Powers,
37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 1017, 1022-23 (1924) (observing that because "judicial power" is not a self-
defining term such as the terms "jury" or "grand jury," "[t]he accumulated weight of repetition
behind such a phrase as 'inherent powers' of the lower Federal courts is a constant invitation to think
of words instead of things"); accord Stephen B. Burbank, Comment, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 997, 1004-06 (1983) (describing sometimes-cited errors of history about inherent power
doctrine).
109. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REv. 735, 847 (2001) ("Article III's grant of
express authority to federal judges implies that they must have ancillary powers that are absolutely
essential to exercise their enumerated ones.").
110. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63; FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS: SWORD
AND SHIELD OF THE JUDICIARY 8 (1994) ("All courts must have... 'from structural necessity' the
inherent powers to do those things that are reasonable and necessary for the administration of justice
.... 11).
111. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563.
112. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 819-20 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("Certain implied powers must
necessarily result to our courts of justice from the nature of their institution .. .which cannot be
dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."); Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (stating that inherent powers are "those which 'are
necessary to the exercise of all others"' (quoting United States v. Hudson, 3 L. Ed. 259 (1812)));
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (noting that inherent powers are "governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"); see also STUMPF, supra note 110, at 3
("Statements of 'inherent powers' abound, but they are usually phrased rather broadly to cover
powers thought essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court because it is a court or
for the orderly, efficient, and effective administration ofjustice.").
113. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46.
114. Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1981).
settlement),"15 to punish contempts, 16 to set aside fraudulently obtained
judgments," 7 to dismiss for want of prosecution," 8 to exclude unruly people
from the courtroom," 9 to notice jurisdictional defects,120 to award attorneys
fees under limited circumstances, 121 to appoint counsel for the indigent,
122
and to order parties to nonbinding mediation. 1
23
A court's inherent power, while derived from the concept of necessity,
is also strictly limited by the necessity test. 124  The Supreme Court has
advised that "[b]ecause of their very potency, inherent powers must be
exercised with restraint and discretion.,' 125 Other courts have called them a
tool of last resort, 126 the use of which must be in some way indispensable to
the resolution of the matter at hand.127  As with the exercise of Rule 11
sanctioning power' 28 (and inherent powers are often invoked in the
sanctioning context), there is respect for the potential to quash zealous
advocacy by overusing the regulatory power. In sum, a legitimate
"inherent" power has long been recognized to use sanctions and sanction-
like powers to impose order on a court's docket, but only when necessary to
do so. 129
115. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1994).
116. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874) ("The power to punish for contempts is
inherent in all courts.").
117. See Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1944); Universal
Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
118. Link v. Wabash R.R, 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962). See generally FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL - 5TH CIRCUIT § 16 (Hon. George P. Kazen et al. eds. 1996).
119. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1970).
120. Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F. Supp. 20, 21 (D. Minn. 1976).
121. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975).
122. See Moore, supra note 108, at 775-80 (compiling cases).
123. In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2002); see Amy M. Pugh & Richard A.
Bales, The Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to Compel Participation in Nonbinding Forms of
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (2003).
124. Degan v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) ("Principles of deference counsel restrain
in resorting to inherent power ... and require its use to be a reasonable response to the problems and
needs that provoke it.").
125. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,
447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
126. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987).
127. See, e.g., ITT Comm. Devel. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Action
taken by a federal court in reliance on its inherent powers must somehow be indispensable to
reaching a disposition of the case."); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Energy Gathering, Inc., 86 F.3d
464, 468 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of inherent power is necessity." (citation
omitted)); see also Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing an award
of sanctions pursuant to a court's inherent power because "the court below ... possessed means
other than sanctions of efficiently managing its docket").
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
129. See Kendall Coffey, Inherent Judicial Authority and the Expert Disqualification Doctrine, 56
FLA. L. REV. 195, 200 (2004) ("[W]hile inherent authority has evolved over almost two centuries as
a permanent dimension of the judicial tapestry, it is a fabric threaded with caution.").
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B. Application to Loud Rules
Courts pronouncing loud rules have not cited any authority for their
power to do so, but they are surely drawing upon their inherent power to
control their docket, whether consciously or not. From this perspective, the
argument would be that loud rules are necessary to prevent a court's docket
from being clogged with cases asserting duplicative and unmeritorious
positions. 130
To comport with the necessity test as stated for other applications of
inherent power, the loud rules should address arguments, such as those
repeatedly asserted in often litigated areas of law, that truly risk disrupting
the court's function. 131 Powers found necessary for the court to function-
such as the power to exclude unruly people from the courtroom or to appoint
counsel for the indigent-are ordinarily necessary for the smooth operation
of a particular case, rather than of an entire docket.132 A broad application
of the necessity test to a court's entire docket is not without precedent,
however. For example, a court has the inherent power to establish local
rules, which enable a court's entire docket to operate smoothly.
133
Therefore, the use of loud rules necessary to the smooth operation of a
court's docket is likely within the confines of a court's inherent power.
V. VOLUME CONTROL
Loud rules can skew the process of making common law, chilling
litigants and exalting sound bites. 13 4 Carefully controlled, however, they can
serve as a useful and appropriate docket tool for controlling troublesome
categories of cases. 13 5 The question is how to channel the influence of these
kinds of statements in positive directions. This part of the Article proposes
130. See supra notes 25-39, 101 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
133. Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1355 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
long recognized that district courts have certain inherent rule-making powers arising from the nature
of the judicial process."); STUMPF, supra note 110, at 17 ("[l]n the past fifty years state appellate
courts, largely subsequent to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and usually
on separation of powers grounds, have increasingly held that they have the inherent and exclusive
power of adopting procedural rules.").
134. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
135. See Jack B. Weinstein, Rendering Advisory Opinions - Do We, Should We?, 54 JUDICATURE
140, 143 (1973) (noting that Townsend v. Sam, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) "lay[] down general principles for the future and avoid[] the necessity of hundreds
of appeals spelling out the rules in detail"). See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as
Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709,1711-22 (1998); Karman, supra note 68, at 791-95.
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that some slight modifications in the concept of "necessity" currently used
by courts, both in distinguishing dictum from holding, and in justifying the
use of inherent power, would help achieve that end while potentially adding
depth to the application of the concept of "necessity" in other related
contexts.
The earlier look at loud rules reveals a parallel between the two
inquiries, albeit one based on one of the more flexible words in legal
parlance. 136 The basic test for distinguishing whether a statement is dictum
or holding looks to the "necessity" of the statement to the result of the
opinion. 13  Similarly, the guideline for the exercise of a court's inherent
power to sanction or otherwise impose order in a case is whether that action
is "necessary" to achieve the desired end. 138 This parallel is rooted in the
similar policies behind the two tests. Both concepts are grounded in the idea
that courts do good work when they take "necessary" action, be it to
effectively explain the rationale of a holding, or to clarify what is expected
of the advocates in a particular case.
Despite the common ground shared by these principles, they are not
entirely at peace with each other.139 A thoughtful, "loud" comment that is
necessary from the perspective of docket management may not be a
"necessary" part of the substantive reasoning of a case. 140 Because the same
parsing of precedent would reach the same destination, with or without the
loud rule, the statement is tarnished as "dicta" and thus has less force as a
precedent.
This result shows an oversight in the "necessity" guideline for
distinguishing holdings and dicta. Each of the policies behind the distinction
between dicta and holdings-accuracy and legitimacy-is advanced by
giving force to an appropriately tailored statement that helps implement the
opinion. If the statement is carefully reasoned and focuses on the proper
operation of a court docket, it is almost surely the appropriate prerogative of
a court to speak to that subject. The rubric of "necessity," then, to the extent
it gives short shrift to such statements, may sweep too broadly. 141
136. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "necessity" in contexts as
diverse as "military necessity," "physical necessity," and "public necessity").
137. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
139. An interesting example of this tension appears in Tate v. Dobucki, 1998 WL 299479 (N.D.
Ill. May 28, 1998). In Tate, the court held:
Tate is hereby advised that he has now had two called 'strikes' That counsels the
need for Tate to exercise caution in the future before he considers bringing any other
litigation .... This should not be misunderstood as a ruling by this Court - it is rather a
cautionary note for Tate to consider.
Id. at *2 n.2. Then what is it?
140. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
141. Perhaps these statements could be called "judicial dicta." See supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text. While that categorization may place them in a higher level of limbo, it is still a
subordinate status.
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A slight recalibration of the guideline would more closely align it with
the underlying policies. If the definition of "necessary" in the dictum-
holding context recognized a procedural element in addition to a wholly
substantive one, it would be more likely to give appropriate weight to
beneficial loud rules. 142 In other words, the doctrine should recognize the
practical reality that it is not enough simply to state necessary components of
results, if those results cannot be effectively implemented. To recognize that
reality, the concept of "necessity," as applied to decide whether a statement
is dictum or holding, should consider whether the statement is necessary to
the effective implementation of the announced rule, as well as whether it
was an appropriate part of the substantive analysis of precedent.
The addition of a procedural necessity component to the dicta-holding
analysis is based on a recognition that opinions have practical docket control
consequences independent of the "pure" legal reasoning of the opinion.
Courts have intuitively recognized this feature of opinion drafting for some
time. A particularly instructive line of authority comes from a group of old
cases holding that courts have inherent power to determine how to structure
and phrase their written opinions. 1
43
In Houston v. Williams,'" for example, the California Supreme Court
struck down a statute requiring it to write out its opinions, reasoning that the
statute made the court unable to conduct business because its opinions
would become elephantine.145  The statute would require the court to write
"expressions of opinion on incidental questions, too strong and
unqualified"'' 4 6 or, in other words, dicta. 147  The decision about what to
emphasize was thus held to be in the "absolute" discretion of the courts. ' 48
142. See generally DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.02,
278-79 (2d ed. 1992) (describing different approaches to distinguishing "procedure" and "substance"
for purposes of the Erie doctrine).
143. See Selya, supra note 52, at 411 n.22; see also A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 29-33 (1958). See generally Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleadings,
Practice or Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937).
144. 13 Cal. 24 (1859).
145. Id. at 25.
146. Id. at 27.
147. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Willets v. Ridgway, 9 Ind. 349, 352
(1857) (describing forced dicta as "the bane" of good opinion writing).
148. Houston, 13 Cal. at 26 (citing Lord Coke's Commentaries). See also Vaughan v. Harp, 4
S.W. 751, 752 (Ark. 1887) (striking down as unconstitutional a statute requiring all supreme court
opinions to be "reduced to writing" and to resolve "all points presented in error that legitimately
arise in the case"); accord Ocampo v. Cabangis, 15 Phil. 626 (Pa. 1910); Speight v. People, 87 I11.
595 (1877). Incidentally, California now has a constitutional provision to the same effect. CAL.
CONST. art. VI § 14 ("Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes
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In the same vein, courts have held that they cannot be required by statute to
prepare a syllabus of opinions, as a judge's function differs fundamentally
from that of a reporter of decisions,149 or to produce written opinions within
statutory deadlines. 5 0
Similarly, courts have historically incorporated the practical
consequences of their holdings into their reasoning by relying on "policy"
arguments. Courts commonly justify a particular reading of precedent with
reference to the consequences of that reading.'51 If this argument structure
is legitimate, it should be equally legitimate when the policy argument
relates to the effective operation of the court system with reference to a
specified category of cases. 152
Moreover, the concept of procedural necessity is not alien to the dicta-
versus-holdings framework. Judicial dicta, which is accorded more
deference than ordinary dicta, is specifically fashioned to provide guidance
to the bench and bar.15 3  Often, this guidance consists of practical tips on
how to implement the court's holding on remand. 154  Other times, judicial
dictum is used to guide lower courts following a major change in the law. "
The procedural benefit of affording deference to judicial dicta weighs in
favor of treating judicial dicta as highly persuasive, if not binding. 5 6
shall be in writing .. "). See generally Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CAL.
L. REV. 486 (1930).
149. In re Griffiths, 20 N.E. 513, 513-14 (Ind. 1889).
150. Coate v. Omholt, 662 P.2d 591, 593 (Mont. 1983).
15 1. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) (delineating six
modalities of constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and
prudential).
152. See generally Weinstein, supra note 135.
153. See Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and
Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 655, 713-14 (1999)
("[J]udicial dicta are those statements of the court which, while not part of the holding, are
nevertheless set forth with the deliberate intent of not merely exploring the legal issue but instructing
the bench and bar."); see also United States v. Bell, 524 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1975) (characterizing
a court's "construction of a statute to guide the future conduct of inferior courts" as judicial dictum).
154. See Chase v. Am. Cartage Co., 186 N.W. 598, 599 (Wis. 1992) ("Thus it frequently happens
that a negligence case, for instance, may have to be reversed because the trial court erred in refusing
to submit the question of contributory negligence to the jury. All that is absolutely necessary to fully
dispose of the appeal is to so decide. But there may also be presented questions of pleadings, of
evidence, of instructions to the jury, of whether defendant was guilty of gross negligence, etc. These
the court will consider and decide for the future guidance of the trial court in that case upon a retrial;
and for trial courts generally."). Similarly, while stating a rule, courts sometimes identify potentially
useful future facts that could distinguish the stated rule or disrupt the analogical connection between
a future case and the case at hand. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
155. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (laying out a framework for
district court sentencing and appellate review of sentences after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)); see also Piscottano v. Murphy, No. 3:04CV682,
2005 WL 1424394, at *3 (D. Conn. June 9, 2005) (characterizing the framework provided by the
Second Circuit in Crosby as judicial dicta).
156. See, e.g., Piscottano, 2005 WL 1424394, at *3.
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In addition to providing an appropriate degree of recognition for helpful
loud rules, the inclusion of a procedural component in the distinction
between dicta and holding sheds some light on the operation of precedent in
other contexts, although the full exploration of those areas is beyond the
scope of this article. Most basically, it helps explain, albeit in a very simple
way, why litigants expect reasons in appellate opinions and why appellate
courts provide them: it is difficult to work without them. Unadorned
conclusions, separated from the actual operation of the court system, are
difficult to assess and "handicap" as the modem, settlement-oriented legal
system demands. 1
5 7
Further, the recognition that procedural concerns impact the statement
of a substantive rule of law sheds some light on the ongoing debate over the
extent to which legal statements should be expressed as rules or as
standards. '58 When a legal statement is expressed so broadly that it becomes
procedurally difficult to implement, as evidenced by a court's straining to be
heard, a shift in generality may be worth considering. The procedural
consequences of a legal statement may influence where the statement should
be placed on the rule-standard continuum.
There are comparable benefits from a similar realignment of the concept
of "necessity" as it is used to decide when to invoke a court's inherent
power. The more a loud rule relates to a statement that is important to the
result of the case, the more legitimacy it gains. If the holding was "X" and
the loud rule related to "Y," the comment would seem so far afield that it
would lose credibility and not be an effective use of inherent power, much
less a meaningful part of the opinion." 9  In other words, the more the
exercise of inherent power reckons with the accepted framework for parsing
the substantive statements in opinions, the more effective it will likely be
157. See Schauer, supra note 66, at 654-58.
158. See EINSENBERG, supra note 70, at 53. Some statements of law are rigid, categorical "rules"
to be followed in a defined factual context, regardless of whether the rule's application is consistent
with the policy underlying the rule. Others take the form of broad "standards" to be applied in every
factual situation that arises, in an effort to conform the result in every case with the governing
rationale. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58
(1992) ("A legal directive is 'rule'-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate
way to the presence of delimited triggering facts .... A legal directive is 'standard'-like when it
tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or
policy to a fact situation.").
159. For example, if the loud rule in Tolson related to ERISA preemption rather than a plan
administrator's abuse of discretion, the loud rule could lose its legitimacy. See Tolson v. Avondale
Indus., 141 F.3d 604, 611 (5th Cir. 1998).
and the fewer collateral consequences it will likely have. The definition of
"necessity" in the context of deciding when to use inherent power should
recognize this reality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding of an opinion is often accompanied by guidance about how
quick a litigant should be to challenge, question, or distinguish the
announced rule. 160 If used indiscriminately, this kind of guidance can be a
particularly pernicious form of dicta, judging cases before they are ready to
be judged, in a manner with particular impact on the bar. 16' At the same
time, however, this kind of statement can help control crowded dockets.
Indeed, if a court can sanction a litigant for a poor argument, it seems both
necessary and desirable that the court be able to admonish its litigants before
sanction issues actually come to a head. 162 Both the perils of this technique,
and its benefits, are likely to grow in influence in a world in which there is
an increasing amount of law and the identification of truly meaningful
precedents becomes an increasing challenge.
This Article's application of the dictum-holding analysis and the
inherent powers doctrine to loud rules presents two basic guidelines for the
appropriate use of loud rules. First, the loud rule should relate to the holding
of the case. Otherwise, the policy reasons underlying the dictum-holding
distinction-consideration and legitimacy-are implicated. 163  Further, the
court's inherent power risks being invoked in an ancillary and ultimately
unimportant matter.'64 Second, the loud rule should relate to a frequently-
asserted argument in an often litigated area of law. If this guideline is not
followed, the court's succinct loud rule, rather than being educated by a
consistent influx of cases before the court, risks being under-considered. 165
Further, rather than being motivated by the need to impose order on an
unruly docket, the court's motivation is less clear and resembles judicial
over-reaching. 66  Finally, if the loud rule does not relate to frequently
litigated arguments, the loud rule is not truly necessary to the smooth
operation of the court's docket, thus potentially exceeding the court's
inherent power. 167
Additionally, while statements in opinions are presently passed through
a test of their "necessity" to the result to determine whether they deserve the
160. See supra notes 15-21, 23-38 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 39-45, 102-12, 118 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 73, 76 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 148 and accompanying text..
165. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text..
166. See supra note 79 and accompanying text..
167. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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force of precedent as a "holding," this Article has proposed a slight
modification of that filter to also give precedential force to statements, such
as loud rules, that are necessary to help implement the result.168 By giving
force to principled, appropriate statements that might not be captured under
the traditional test, this acknowledgment can help capture the beneficial
aspects of loud rules while passing over incidental comments and stray
remarks. This framework may also help resolve some issues about the level
of generality at which to phrase case holdings.
Similarly, this Article has also proposed that use of the inherent power
to sanction gains legitimacy if it focuses on the significant substantive issues
at issue in the case, i.e., the ones that are "necessary" to the substantive
result of the case. 169 This focus avoids the appearance, or perhaps even the
reality, of sanctions motivated by trivial matters or judicial caprice. The end
result of moving toward this focus, as well as the modification discussed
above in the test for what constitutes a "holding," will hopefully be a more
effective development of common law through wise use of the powerful
device of the loud rule.
168. See supra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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